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Clark: Criminal Contempt Procedure in Florida–Proposals

NOTES
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT PROCEDURE IN FLORIDA
PROPOSALS

-

The judicial process is the very heart of our system of laws. If
disputes are to be settled peacefully in our society, the judicial process must operate smoothly and must be protected from conduct
tending to disrupt and interfere with the efficient administration of
justice. In protecting this essential process the courts have long
exercised a power to punish for criminal contempt of court., The
exercise of this judicial power may often result in a judge acting as
a prosecutor, factfinder, and penalty assessor. Notwithstanding the
fact that the judicial officers of Florida have generally exercised extreme self-restraint, 2 the very existence of the power to fine and imprison for contempt increases the probability that the power may be
wielded in derogation of the alleged contemnor's personal liberties.
Should the same constitutional guarantees, which are generally given
to one accused of a crime, also be afforded to one accused of criminal
contempt? In attempting to resolve this problem emphasis should
not be placed solely upon amelioration of the plight of the accused.
Consideration must also be given to the rights of the public at large
and to the judicial officers of the state, for both of these segments of
the population have an important stake in the efficient and dignified
administration of justice. A partial balancing of these diverse interests may be accomplished by the establishment of uniform procedural safeguards and punishment limitations.
Neither the Florida Legislature, nor the Florida Supreme Court,
has adopted any formal procedure to govern criminal contempt cases.
As a result of this void in our law much doubt has arisen concerning
the proper manner of proceeding in a criminal contempt case. The
purposes of the following analysis are threefold: First, to point out
some general problems in the area of contempt; second, to codify
the present procedure used in trying criminal contempt cases and to
illustrate the confusion arising under the present status of the procedure; and third, to offer legislative and judiciary proposals in an
effort to solve the problems arising from criminal contempt proceedings.
GENERAL PROBLEM AREAS

In addition to the lack of uniform procedure under present Florida
law, the substance of acts that should be regarded as contemptuous is,
1. E.g., Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924); Weldon v. State, 150
Ark. 407, 234 S.W. 466 (1921); Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755 (1923);
Bradley v. State, II1 Ga. 168, 36 S.E. 630 (1900).
2. This is evidenced by the comparatively small number of reported cases.
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at best, ill-defined. The test for ascertaining whether the conduct
complained of should be viewed as contemptuous is the reasonable
tendency of the acts to obstruct, embarrass, or impede the efficient
administration of justice.3 What one judge may consider to be contemptuous another might totally ignore. Compounding the problem
of defining contemptuous conduct is the practically unbridled discretion of the courts to determine the severity of punishment to be
imposed. The penalty to be inflicted is generally limited only by the
Florida Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishment. 4 The single exception to this general rule is
set out in Florida Statutes, section 38.22, which provides that "the
punishment imposed by-a justice of the peace shall not exceed twenty
dollars fine or twenty-four hours imprisonment." 5 The majority of
sentences imposed have been upheld on review, but occasionally an
excessively severe term of imprisonment may be reversed with direction to reduce the sentence imposed. In Neering v. State,6 the First
District Court of Appeal held that a one-year sentence imposed upon
one who had illegally contacted a prospective juror, was cruel and
unusual when viewed by state constitutional standards. Thus the
question whether the penalty is commensurate with the seriousness
of the offense is determined on a case-by-case basis.
The procedure differs depending on whether the contempt was
civil or criminal and whether it was direct or indirect. These distinctions must, therefore, be examined before a proper understanding
of the procedural aspects may be acquired. Criminal contempt has
been defined as conduct that is directed against the authority and
dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially.7 Punishment is accordingly imposed to vindicate the authority and dignity of the
court.8 Civil contempt consists of a violation of duty or other misconduct by which a right or remedy of a party to a civil action, or
other special proceeding, may be impaired, defeated, or prejudiced.
The punishment imposed for civil contempt is remedial in nature and
is made for the benefit of the aggrieved party.9 But often the line
between civil and criminal contempt is difficult to see and one act may
constitute both types of contempt. As an example, when the provisions of a divorce decree requiring the payment of alimony are not
complied with, a subsequent action may be brought charging the
3.

Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 314, 95 So. 755, 760 (1923).
4. FLA. CONsT. Deci. of Rights §8.
5. FLA. STAT. §38.22 (1963).
6. 141 So. 2d 615 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1962).
7. Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 314, 95 So. 755, 760 (1928).
8. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Tampa So. R.R., 101 Fla. 468, 473, 134 So.
529, 532 (1931).
9. Ibid. Orr v. Orr, 141 Fla. 112, 116, 192 So. 466, 467 (1939).
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noncomplying party with civil contempt. Is not justice being flouted
in much the same manner when someone insults a judge in open
court? The distinction, however, remains important under present
law as to the following: (1) the nature of the proceedings; and (2)
the degree of proof required to substantiate a charge. A civil contempt proceeding is tried as a part of the original cause and is generally a contest between the original parties; whereas a criminal contempt proceeding is between the public and the alleged contemnor,
is properly instituted in the name of the state, and is not a part
of the original cause. 10 A preponderance of the evidence will substantiate a charge of civil contempt; but a criminal contempt must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt."'
The distinction between direct and indirect contempt applies
equally to both civil and criminal contempts. A direct contempt consists of conduct committed in the presence of the court or so near
thereto as to impede the effective administration of justice.12 Contemptuous conduct occurring outside the immediate or constructive
presence of the court is indirect contempt.13
PRESENT STATUS OF PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

The common law is declared to be in force in Florida, but only
to the extent that such law is not inconsistent with the laws of the
United States and the legislative enactments of this state.' 4 Accordingly, the procedures utilized by the common law courts are in force
to the same extent. 15 By constitutional amendment 16 the Supreme
Court of Florida has been given the primary authority for promulgating rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the
state. The supreme court has instituted several rules governing criminal procedure and practice on the appellate court level, but as yet
has failed to promulgate criminal procedure rules for the pretrial and
trial levels. The legislature has also failed to designate any formalized rules governing criminal contempt proceedings. There is
thus a necessity for almost exclusive reliance on common law procedure for trying contempt cases.
10.

See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Tampa So. R.R., 101 Fla. 468, 134 So. 529

(1931).
11. Marshall v. Clark, 45 So. 2d 667, 670 (Fla. 1950); Stokes v. Scott, 138 Fla.
235, 237, 189 So. 272, 273 (1939).
12. Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 314, 95 So. 755, 760 (1923); Ex parte
Biggers, 85 Fla. 322, 339, 95 So. 763, 768 (1923).
13.

Ibid.

14.

FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1963).

15.

FLA. STAT. §2.03 (1963).

16.

FLA. CONST. art. V, §3.
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At common law the power to punish for contempt was recognized
7
This power
was a means established to protect the authority, dignity, and efficiency
of the courts.' s In State v. Clark's the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that the power to punish for contempt is
20
both necessary and inherent and declined to construe a statute,
which specifically granted the power. The court reasoned that an
inherent judicial power cannot validly be granted or limited by the
legislature. Although the courts may jealously insist that the power
to punish for contempt is strictly an inherent power, there appears
to be both an inherent and a statutory basis for the power.
The court whose authority and dignity have been assailed generally acquires both original and exclusive jurisdiction to try the
alleged contemnor.2 ' Jurisdiction is acquired in this manner irrespective of whether the contempt is direct or indirect, criminal or
civil. An exception to this general rule may exist when one court in
acting as the agent of another court, may appropriately enforce the
orders of the latter through contempt proceedings.22 This agency
relation exists where a cause has been appealed and the appellate
court is authorized to enforce an order mady by the trial court, which
has been violated by a party to the proceedings.

as an inherent as well as a plenary power of the courts.

Direct Criminal Contempt - Present Procedure
Whether the contempt is direct or indirect will have an important
bearing on the procedure used to try the cause. When the contempt is
direct, that is, committed in the presence of the court, the presiding
judge of his own initiative may commence the proceedings. In a
direct contempt action, the court acts upon view and without a
hearing and may summarily punish the contemnor. 23 If a party were
to direct a flagrant insult toward a judge acting judicially and in his
presence, the judge insulted could immediately find the insulting
party to be guilty of contempt and impose a fine, a period of imprisonment, or both.24 The accused is afforded no hearing, no time
to prepare a defense, and no opportunity to challenge the judge for
possible bias. In addition to lack of procedural safeguards, no
17. Ex parte Edwards, 11 Fla. 174, 186 (1867).
18. Ibid.
19. 46 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1950).
20. FLA. STAT. §38.22 (1963).
21. State v. Thomas, 128 Fla. 231, 235, 174 So. 413, 415 (1937).
22. Ibid.
23. State v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 481, 484, 129 So. 818, 820 (1930); Ex parte
Biggers, 85 Fla. 322, 339, 95 So. 763, 768 (1923).
24. Ibid.
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definitive punishment limitations are available to curb the possible
abuse of the summary power. The alleged contemnor also lacks an
established right of appeal to review his judgment, although habeas
corpus is available as a mode of review.25
If a criminal contempt is equated with a crime, then several constitutional questions may arise concerning the propriety of this procedure. Should the accused have a right to counsel, sufficient time
to prepare a defense, trial by jury, or other procedural safeguards
generally afforded to one accused of a crime? There is no common
law or constitutional right to a jury trial when the charge is contempt. 26 Other procedural safeguards, such as the right to a hearing by
an impartial tribunal and a right to counsel, are denied to the contemnor in direct criminal contempt proceedings on three rationales.
First, criminal contempt is not a crime but is an offense peculiarly
within a court's power to punish. Therefore, the due process requirements generally applicable to one accused of a crime do not
apply in toto to one accused of criminal contempt.2 7 Secondly, the
courts reason that there must be authority to summarily punish if
proper courtroom decorum is to be maintained.2 8 When a witness
refuses to testify or when an attorney uses defamatory language in
addressing the bench, the use of this summary power can be amply
justified. Thirdly, the automatic or optional disqualification of a
judge on grounds of bias is generally not allowed because the presiding judge has peculiar knowledge of the facts giving rise to the
contempt.
PROPOSALS -

DIRECT CONTEMPT

What can be done in order to provide adequate protection for
the alleged contemnor without unduly hampering the necessary
exercise of the summary power to punish? Several legislative enactments would be desirable in this connection. The first proposed legislation would be entitled Violations Against Public Justice - Contempt
of Court.29 The title of this statutory enactment would partially
25. See State v.
calco, 153 Fla. 666,
(1935); Neering v.
110 So. 2d 22 (3d
Machinists, 131 So.

Sullivan, 157 Fla. 496, 26 So. 2d 509 (1946); Ex parte Manis15 So. 2d 445 (1943); Jones v. King, 120 Fla. 87, 162 So. 353
State, 141 So. 2d 615 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962); Dodd v. State,
D.C.A. Fla. 1959). Compare In re Local 1248, Int'l Ass'n of
2d 29 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1961); In re Pennekamp, 155 Fla. 589,

21 So. 2d 41 (1945).
26. See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165 (1958).
27. Ibid.
28. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
29. For similar provisions see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§565-68 (1958); W.
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eliminate the present confusion as t6 whether criminal contempt
should be classified as a crime. Under the proposed heading all contempts of courts would be Violations and not felonies or misdemeanors which are, of course, criminal classifications. This statute would
distinguish between contemptuous conduct committed in the immediate presence of the court and contemptuous conduct committed
outside the presence of the court.30
Under the proposed statute the power to summarily punish for
direct contempts would be retained; but limitations on this power
would also be spelled out. One limitation would be a maximum
punishment provision. Other states have settled on a fine not to
exceed $250 and imprisonment not to exceed thirty days in the
county jail where the court in sitting.31 This limitation places a rea-

sonable maximum on the court's ability to punish without taking
away the effectiveness of this deterrent. An exception to this punishment limitation would exist only when the contemptuous conduct
consists of the failure to do an act that is within the power of the
contemnor to perform.32 Punishment limitations would serve as
more useful guidelines than the constitutional prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishments.33 Although a statutory limitation of
a court power may be looked upon as an usurpation of judicial
authority, 34 the courts should be cognizant of the great benefits to be
derived by this limitation. Without any limitations a possibility of
abuse of the discretionary power exists. Strong dissents in recent
United States Supreme Court cases indicate that the punishment for
criminal contempt should not be boundless unless the usual criminal
procedural safeguards are afforded to the defendant. 35 Although the
United States Supreme Court still adheres to the proposition that
criminal contempt is not a crime, 36 absent any punishment limitations,
it would not be surprising if this holding were to be overturned.
When an act may be punished as if it were an infamous crime,
VA. CODE ANN. §6024 (1961). Note that these statutes classify contempt of court
as a crime.
30. Ibid.
31. MicH. STAT. ANN. §27A.1715 (1962); N. Y. JuDIcIARY LAW §751. For various
other statutory punishment limitations see ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-902 (1962); CAL.
PEN. CODE §19; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §432.260 (1963); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 275,
§14 (1956).
32. HAwAII REv. LAWS §269-2 (1955); MicH. STAT. ANN. §27A.1715 (1962).
33. FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights §8.
34. See Fort v. Cooperative Farmers' Exch., 81 Colo. 431, 256 Pac. 319 (1927);
State v. Clark, 46 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1950); Bradley v. State, 111 Ga. 168, 36 S.E. 630

(1900).
35.

United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 725 (1964)

(dissenting opinion);

Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
36. See cases cited note 26 supra.
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questions concerning the advisability of denying a hearing, the right
to counsel, or a jury trial are bound to arise. On the other hand, if
the power to punish is placed within moderate bounds, future
conflicts with federal decisions may never arise. Assuming that direct
contempt justifies a summary proceeding, the Florida courts should
be willing to accept statutory punishment limitations. The establishment of such limitations would not only serve to protect the alleged
contemnor, but would also assure the continued use of an efficient
means of protecting the judicial process from abuse.
If contemptuous conduct warrants additional punishment, for
example an assault and battery inflicted in open court, then the
regular criminal process should be used to impose this punishment.
This latter problem creates the need for an additional statutory provision to the effect that the contemnor is also subject to a criminal
prosecution for the same misconduct giving rise to the contempt
3
charge, but only if the conduct is also a criminal offense. 7
The primary responsibility for providing procedural safeguards
is placed upon the Florida Supreme Court.3 8 Under a proposed court
rule, which would be entitled Supplementary and Special Proceeding
39
- Contempt of Court, the summary power to punish for contempt
After
adjudicating contempt, the judge should
would be retained.
execute a statement certifying that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and also that it was committed in the actual
presence of the court. 40 No hearing would be provided as expediency
considerations dominate. The need for disqualification is counterbalanced by the fact that the judge has personal knowledge of the misconduct and also by considerations of expediency. An exception to
the general power to punish summarily would exist only when a
judge who has personally been assailed delays imposition of punishment until the pending litigation terminates. In such a case, the
alleged contemnor would be given notice of the accusation, a hearing
and a right to challenge the judge for possible bias. When delay
ensues in the adjudication of direct contempt, arguments for expediency fade into the background; and the right to a hearing by an
41
impartial tribunal becomes a dominant consideration.
The contempt judgment should be made a matter of record and
should contain a specific statement of the acts constituting the con37. See CAL. PEN. CODE §657; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §432.280
STAT. §22.120 (1960).
38.
39.
40.
41.
States,

(1963); NEV. REV.

FLA. CONST. art. V, §3.
DEL. CODE ANN. Sup. Ct. (Crim.) R. 42 (1953).
Ibid.
See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954). But cf. Sacher v. United
343 U.S. 1 (1952).
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tempt. 42 This requirement would enhance the effectiveness of the
right to appeal a direct contempt judgment. Although appeals have
been allowed in some cases, the reported law is not clear whether
the contemnor has an established right of appeal. To provide more
certainty in this area the proposed rule should also contain a pro-

vision for appeal. On appeal the reviewing court would be furnished
with a copy of the judgment, which would also be a record of the
facts. The appellate court would then be able not only to review
the applicable law on the judgment, but would also be free to ascertain whether the facts justified the charge.4 3 The mode of review
would in essence be a trial de novo, thus providing the contemnor
with an additional safeguard against possible abuse of the summary
power. An appeal could be taken only after final judgment; and if
the nature of the offense requires removal of the contemnor in order
to maintain courtroom decorum, this removal would, of necessity,
precede the appeal. Habeas corpus should also be retained as a
method of review; but this would only protect the contemnor when
the legality of his imprisonment was brought in question and would
not be available when only a fine is imposed.44 Allowing appeal in
the form of a trial de novo could lead to a uniform policy as to
which acts should generally be classified as contemptuous. The overseeing authority of a higher tribunal might also be effective in
curbing possible temptations to abuse the summary power to punish
for contempt.
The contemnor should be entitled to bail pending an appeal; but
allowance of bail would be left to the discretion of the court or judge
imposing sentence. The plight of the accused to be subject to the
court's discretion here is somewhat ameliorated by the fact that he
still may obtain fairly speedy relief through the initiation of habeas
corpus proceedings. 45
INDIRECT CRIMINAL CONTEMPT -

PRESENT PROCEDURES

When the alleged contempt is committed out of the presence of
the court, the court may not of its own motion institute the contempt
proceedings. Such contempt is the basis for an indirect or constructive contempt prosecution.4 6 Due process requires that the accused be
advised of the charges against him and that he have a reasonable op-

42. HAwAii REv. LAws §269-5 (1955); N.Y.
§2A:10-3 (1952).
43. NJ. STAT. ANN. §2A:10-3 (1952).

JuDICIARY LAW

§752; N.J.

STAT.

ANN.

44. In re Pennekamp, 155 Fla. 589, 590, 21 So. 2d 41, 42 (1945).
45. FLA. STAT. §79.01 (1963).
46. Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755 (1923).
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portunity to defend himself. 47 These requirements of due process are
satisfied by use of a rule to show cause, which is a writ issued by the
court and directed to the alleged contemnor requiring him to appear
before the court and to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt.48 The Florida courts have given the rule to show cause
various labels, such as rule to show cause,49 rule nisi, ° rule,51 order
imposing sanctions,52 and citation.5 3 This confusion in use of terminology probably stems from the fact that there are no formalized
rules that the courts may use as guidelines in conducting criminal
contempt cases. Perhaps the words rule to show cause best describe
the initial stage of the proceedings, because the term implies that the
person served with the writ must produce an answer explaining his
conduct.
The rule to show cause generally contains a statement of the acts
constituting the alleged contempt, an inquiry of the defendant why
he should not be adjudged in contempt, and a specified date upon
which the defendant will be required to appear before the court to
answer the charge.5 4 Although the rule to show cause must usually
be predicated upon the affidavits of those having actual knowledge
of the facts, the Florida Supreme Court has held that oral testimony
taken by a special investigator before a court is a sufficient predicate
for issuance of the rule.5 5 The court has also held that an information
charging criminal contempt was not invalid because material allegations were made on inferences and beliefs adduced from sworn testimony.

6

Although an information is not an essential facet of criminal

contempt proceedings, some charges of contempt have been brought
by issuance of an information. If criminal contempt is not a crime,
the practice of using an information cannot be justified.
The rule to show cause is generally required to be personally
served; however, when personal service cannot be made the practice
is to leave a copy of the rule at the accused's last place of residence57
If the acts constituting the alleged contempt are extremely serious in
47. Lee v. Bauer, 72 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1954); Comment, 8 U. FL. L. REV.
230 (1955).
48. Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755 (1923).
49. Ibid.
50. Baumgartner v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 335, 141 So. 185 (1932).
51. Croft v. Culbreath, 150 Fla. 60, 6 So. 2d 638 (1942).
52. Lee v. Bauer, 72 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1954); Comment, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 230
(1955).
53. Geary v. State, 139 So. 2d 891 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
54. See cases cited note 25 supra.
55. State v. Clark, 46 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1950).
56. Ex parte Maniscalco, 153 Fla. 666, 15 So. 2d 445 (1943); Ex parte Crews,
127 Fla. 381, 173 So. 275 (1937).
57. Palmer v. Palmer, 28 Fla. 295, 300, 9 So. 657, 658 (1891).
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nature, the court may issue a writ of attachment without the rule to
show cause.58 The attachment is similar to a warrant of arrest and
secures the presence of the defendant more quickly than would be
possible if only a rule to show cause were issued. The power to issue
a writ of attachment stems from an historical carryover of the common
law. 59 Under a Florida statute, 60 the judicial officers of the state ard
authorized to issue summonses for offenses to be tried summarily and
also to issue a warrant of arrest in those cases in which the person
charged is not likely to appear upon a summons. This statute6 '
seems to apply because judges are empowered to try contempt actions
summarily. When four different processes are used to secure the
presence of the alleged contemnor, can there be any doubt that confusion may arise?
There is no authority in Florida specifically granting the alleged
contemnor a right to be admitted to bail. If, however, the criminal
nature of the contempt charge is emphasized, this offense may fall
within the Florida criminal statute62 granting bail as a matter of right
under similar circumstances. On the other hand, if the wrongs classified as contempt are construed to fall beyond the outer limits of those
offenses commonly classified as crimes, the above-mentioned statute
would not apply. 63 If criminal contempt were classified as either a
civil or a criminal wrong, some standards might be available by which
a uniform procedure could be gauged. Under the present status of
Florida law grave doubts arise concerning the propriety of allowing
one accused of criminal contempt to be admitted to bail.64
After the alleged contemnor has been served with the rule to
show cause a certain interval will elapse allowing the accused time to
prepare a defense. During this time the defendant may move to quash
the rule or in the alternate move for a bill of particulars if the
contents of the rule are vague and misleading.65 Here the Florida
courts have been in agreement that criminal contempt procedure
should be patterned after criminal procedure.66 Safe practice warrants
strict compliance with the statutes governing the motion to quash and
58. Ex parte Biggers, 85 Fla. 322, 340, 95 So. 763, 768 (1923).
59.

Ibid.

60.

FIA. STAT.

61.

Ibid.

§901.09 (1) (1963).

62. FLA. STAT. §903.01 (1963).
63. Accord, Puleo v. State, 109 So. 2d 39 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
64. Compare Puleo v. State, 109 So. 2d 39 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959), with In re
Local 1248, Intel Ass'n of Machinists, 131 So. 2d 29 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1961), and
In re Pennekamp, 155 Fla. 589, 21 So. 41. (1945).
65. See Geary v. State, 139 So. 2d 891 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1962); Dodd v. State,
110 So. 2d 22 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
66. Ibid.
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the motion for a bill of particulars.7 For some purposes, contempt is
viewed as a crime, but for other purposes it is not. The Florida courts,
as well as the federal courts, have consistently held that contempt
proceedings are not technically criminal prosecutions.6s
The common law rule was that the sworn denial of the allegations contained in the rule to show cause would automatically entitle
the alleged contemnor to be discharged. 69 This rule was qualified by
the fact that the denial must be definite and specific. 70 In State v.
Lewis71 the Florida Supreme Court held that the common law rule
had been superseded by Florida Statutes, section 38.22, which provides
"Every court may punish contempts against it... and in any such proceeding the court shall proceed to hear and determine all questions of
law and fact ... "72 Under present Florida law, therefore, even a
specific denial of the allegations contained in the rule to show cause
will not entitle the alleged contemnor to be discharged.
The accused may make what is commonly called a return or
answer to the rule to show cause either before or at the hearing. If
the return is made prior to the hearing, then this stage of the proceeding might be classified as a preliminary motion or plea to the
charge. Although the reported case law is not clear on this point, the
use of a return contemplates a plea of innocence or guilt. The accused, however, cannot be compelled to testify against himself during
these proceedings.73 In this situation the Florida Supreme Court has
made the constitutional prohibition of self-incrimination applicable to
74
contempt as if it were to be classified as a crime.
No common law or constitutional right to trial by jury exists
when the charge is contempt.7 5 By statute7 6 a jury may be demanded
in some cases of contempt in federal courts. The Florida Legislature
has specifically provided that the court shall hear all issues of law
and fact arising under a charge of contempt, 77 thus implying that
there is no right to a jury trial. The Florida courts have also been
reluctant to recognize a right to trial by jury. This policy can be
justified only if criminal contempt is neither classified, prosecuted, nor
punished as a crime.
67. FLA. STAT. §§906.25, .07 (1963).
68. E.g., Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95 (1924); Puleo v. State, 109 So. 2d
39 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
69. Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 320, 95 So. 755, 762 (1923).
70. Ibid.
71. 80 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1955).
72. FLA. STAT. §38.22 (1963).
73. Demetree v. State, 89 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1956).
74. Id. at 502.
75. See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
76. Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. §3691 (1948).
77. FLA. STAT. §38.22 (1963).
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The Florida Supreme Court has held that a judge, whose personal
integrity has been assailed by the alleged contemnor, is not automatically disqualified to preside at the subsequent hearing. 78 From
this decision a reasonable implication can be made that the judge
may voluntarily disqualify himself. Under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure the judge assailed is automatically disqualified
from presiding at the hearing, unless the defendant consents to the
same judge's hearing of the cause.7 9 The Florida practice, which
does not automatically disqualify a judge who has been personally
affronted, may reflect a vote of confidence for the unbiased integrity
and ability to remain aloof of our state judicial officers. This same
practice may also be based on the fear that a judge sitting in the
stead of one of his colleagues would not feel constrained to impose a
severe sentence; whereas, the judge assailed might be hesitant to impose a stiff penalty under circumstances in which he could be accused
of being prejudiced. Underlying the federal practice is the assumption
that judges are subject to the same emotions as other human beings
and cannot generally avoid being prejudiced toward the alleged contemnor. When the contempt is indirect and considerations of expediency are not acute, the alleged contemnor's right to an impartial
tribunal becomes a pressing need.
If the accused wishes to be represented by counsel at the contempt
hearing, he will be granted this request.8 0 A word of caution is
warranted here. The Florida courts have not specifically held that
an absolute right to court-appointed counsel exists under these circumstances. Once again the criminal nature of the offense, as it now
stands, may pose constitutional questions of great significance.81
Especially is this true when note is taken of the fact that there are no
well-defined limits on the punishment to be imposed. To illustrate
the seriousness of the punishment that may be inflicted, the Florida
Supreme Court has approved a sentence that entailed six-months im82
prisonment.
Assuming that the judge presiding over the contempt hearing
finds that the evidence sustains the charge, he will proceed to adjudicate the defendant guilty. The next stage in the proceedings will
be the imposition of sentence. Because the purpose of the punishment
is punitive rather than remedial, the term of imprisonment must be
definite and certain.8 3 Although the punishment must be definite and
78. State v. Sullivan, 157 Fla. 496, 26 So. 2d 509 (1946); Pennekamp v. State,
156 Fla. 227, 22 So. 2d 875 (1945), rev'd on other grounds, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
79. FED. R. CRM. P. 42 (b).
80. State v. Sullivan, 157 Fla. 496, 26 So. 2d 509 (1946).
81. See cases cited note 35 supra.
82. Demetree v. State, 89 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1956).
83. State v. Pearson, 132 Fla. 878, 182 So. 233 (1938).
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certain, the boundaries within which punishment may be inflicted
are limited only by the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. 84 This is not only an insufficient standard for the judge im-

posing the sentence, but also poses a serious threat to the contemnor.
The majority of criminal contempt judgments are reviewed
through the initiation of habeas corpus proceedings. As a practical
matter this method of review provides the quickest relief when the
contemnor is illegally confined, but is also frequently used because of
the uncertainty that exists concerning the contemnor's right to appeal. 85 Although some Florida cases have intimated that review of
criminal contempt judgments should be patterned after the appellate procedure followed in reviewing criminal judgments generally,
there remains much confusion as to the proper method of seeking review of a contempt judgment. 6
PROPOSALS -

INDIRECT CONTEMPT

The punishment to be inflicted for criminal contempt needs to be
limited. The task of imposing these limitations is primarily a legislative responsibility. The legislature must also assume the initiative
in appropriately classifying contempt. If criminal contempt is not
a crime, then the criminal label should be omitted from its new
classification. In the discussion for proposals applying to direct contempts it was previously pointed out that the legislative draft would
classify contempts under the following caption: Violations Against
Public Justice - Contempt of Court.87 This classification would
demonstrate that contempt is not a crime. The only distinction
would be between direct and indirect contempts. The summary power
would be retained to punish direct contempts; but indirect contempts,
that is misconduct occurring without the presence of the court,
would be punished only as prescribed under a newly proposed court
rule. Limitations on punishment should apply to both direct and
indirect contempts with equal force. These limitations would be that
any court or judicial officer may punish contempts by fine not exceeding $250 or by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days in the county
jail where the court is sitting.88 An exception to these punishment
limitations would apply to cover a case in which the contempt consists of failure to do an act that is within the power of the contemnor
84. FLA. CONST. Del. of Rights §8.
85. See Lewis v. Lewis, 78 So. 2d 711, 712 (Fla. 1955).
86. For a further analysis of the contemnor's right to seek a review see
Comment, 9 MIAMI L.Q. 281, 284-89 (1955).
87. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§565-68 (1958); W. VA. CODE ANN. §6024
(1961). Note that these statutes classify contempt under criminal offenses.
88. See MICH. STAT. ANN. §27A.1715 (1962); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §751. For
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to perform.89 If the contempt consists of an attempt to bribe a judge
or juror, the contemnor would also be subject to a separate and
additional punishment through initiation of a criminal prosecution.90
The second major problem area in need of clarification concerns
the actual procedure to be applied in cases of contempt. The primary responsibility here is placed upon the Florida Supreme Court.9 '
Under a proposed court rule all doubts as to who should initiate the
proceedings would be eliminated. Present practice permits a prosecuting attorney to initiate proceedings through use of an information.
This practice is objectionable on two grounds: (1) contempt of
court is not a crime; and (2) the attendant delays and failure to
prosecute that may accompany reliance on prosecution by prosecuting
attorneys of other courts. The proposed rule would contain a proviso to the effect that only courts or judicial officers shall initiate contempt proceedings. Initiation of indirect contempt proceedings
should only be made on the basis of a sworn statement executed by
someone with knowledge of the facts. In order to secure the presence
of the alleged contemnor, the normal practice will be to issue a rule
to show cause; but the power to issue a writ of attachment should
be retained when the misconduct would seriously impede further litigation or when the judicial officer has reasonable grounds to believe
that the accused would not appear through issuance of the rule to
92
show cause.
The rule to show cause should contain a sufficient statement of
the facts giving rise to the charge of contempt, name it as such, and
allow a reasonable time for preparation of defense.93 Time limitations on motions and pleadings should be contained in the rule. Also,
the date, time, and place of the hearing should be set out in the rule.
The rule should inform the alleged contemnor that he may bring
counsel to represent him at the hearing, present witnesses, and move
for disqualification of the presiding judge.
If the writ of attachment is issued in lieu of the rule to show cause,
the court should be required to issue to the accused written intervarious other statutes imposing punishment limitations see ARK. STAT. ANN.
§34-902 (1962); CAL. PEN. CODE §19; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §432.260 (1963); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. §13:4611 (Supp. 1964); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 275, §14 (1956).
89. HAWAI RV. Lows §269-2 (1955); MicH. STAT. ANN. §27A.1715 (1962).
90. See CAL. PEN. CODE §657; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §432.280 (1963); Nav. REv.
STAT. §22.120 (1960).
91. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §3.
92. The retention of this common law writ may be justified on two additional
grounds: (1) the practice of issuing writs of attachment is deeply embedded and
(2) use of an attachment will serve to accentuate the distinct character of contempt proceedings.
93. See DEL. CODE ANN. Sup. Ct. (Crim.) R.42 (1953).
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rogatories that sufficiently state the circumstances giving rise to the
contempt charge. 94 The writ of attachment and the rule to show cause
would both be personally served upon the alleged contemnor by the
sheriff or other court appointed officer. If the accused is taken into
custody pending hearing, he would be entitled to bail as of right. The
amount of the undertaking may be endorsed on the rule or writ of
attachment. Bail pending appeal may be granted at the discretion of
the court.
The judicial officer who has been personally assailed is automatically disqualified from presiding at the hearing, unless the
alleged contemnor consents to his hearing of the cause. Because the
judge who has a pecuniary interest in the conviction of the accused
is generally disqualified, 95 a judge whose personal bias may prevent
a fair hearing should also be disqualified.
Power to hear the cause would be retained by the court; and no
change of venue motion would be allowed. The accused would be
afforded protection against any possible bias because of the judge's
disqualification. No jury trial should be provided under the proposed
court rule. If the judicial process is to remain an efficient forum
for resolving human conflicts, the power to punish for contempt must
be wielded in a reasonably swift fashion. A jury trial would only
prolong the deterrent effect of swift punishment. All other litigation
should not be impeded while jurors are selected, challenged, impanelled, and finally deliberate a contempt charge. No compelling
reason exists for requiring a jury trial because contempt is not a
crime and other procedural safeguards, such as notice, hearing, disqualification, and appeal are afforded to the accused. Also, a judicial
officer is usually better qualified, through direct experience, to determine and resolve what issues of fact tend to impede or obstruct the
judicial process. A jury might view the facts in such a way that
would blend issues of both law and fact, and thus effectively control
the outcome of a case. If the sole determination of the case is left
in the hands of a judicial officer, the possibility of a jury's extension
of function would be extinguished.
Upon a finding of guilt the court should make the judgment and
order for sentence a matter of record. The judgment should specifically state the circumstances under which the contempt charge was
made. 96 Recordation of the facts would insure the effectiveness of
an appeal or other method of review.
A right to review indirect contempt judgments by way of appeal
should definitely be established. This right of appeal should exist
94.
95.
96.
ANN.

See N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §769.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1926).
See HAWAII REV. LAWS §269-5 (1955); N.Y.

JUDICIARY LAW

§752; N.J.

STAT.

§2A:10-3 (1952).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

15

1965]

Florida Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1965], Art. 4
NOTES

to review sentences imposing either a fine or imprisonment or both.
No valid reason exists as to why an appeal should not be a matter
of right under these circumstances. Habeas corpus should also be retained as a mode of review for this method would provide the contemnor with an additional safeguard against a possible abuse of judicial
power.
CONCLUSION

Legislative and judicial proposals have been offered in an effort
to solve some problems generated by criminal contempt cases. While
recognizing that any punishment limitations are arbitrary in nature,
the absence of any restraints compounds arbitrariness with potentially
dangerous power. The courts should be cognizant of the need to
curb this power and thus yield to a statutory limitation.
The need for uniform rules of procedure is apparent for several
reasons. Without formalized rules the probability increases that even
a highly competent judge will make a procedural error in trying a
cause. Confusion in the use of terminology could be reduced to a
minimum under standardized rules. Uniformity of procedure would
certainly be a step in the direction of securing the alleged contemnor's personal liberties. On the other hand, lack of uniform procedure
may breed disrespect for Florida's judicial system.
Proposals for punishment limitations, and uniform procedures
have been illustrated with the hope that they may be useful guidelines in clarifying the confusion now prevalent and in improving
this area of the law. Grasping the seriousness of the existing and
potential problems should augment any desire of the reader to initiate
some sorely needed changes.
ALLAN P. CLARK
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